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Abstract
It would seem, on the surface, logical that entrepreneurs would treat stakeholders with honesty and respect. However, this 
is not always the case—at times, entrepreneurs lie to stakeholders in order to take a step closer to achieving legitimacy. It is 
these legitimacy lies that are the focus of the current work. Overall, while we know that legitimacy lies are told, we know 
very little about the psychological processes at work that may make it more likely for someone to tell a legitimacy lie. Thus, 
we theorize about the pressure to pursue legitimacy, the situational and individual factors that affect this pursuit, as well as 
how this context can lead to moral disengagement and the telling of legitimacy lies. Our theorizing advances the existing 
literature and provides a dynamic framework by which future research can delve more deeply into the nuanced context that 
breeds the escalation of legitimacy lies.
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Introduction
Entrepreneurs in early-stage ventures must earn the approval 
and support of key stakeholders in order to gain access to 
the resources needed for their venture’s survival and growth 
(Uberbacher 2014). For this to be achieved, ventures need to 
attain legitimacy in order for their actions to be perceived as 
“desirable, proper, or appropriate” (Suchman 1995, p. 574). 
This implies that legitimacy attainment is a dichotomous 
state: either a stakeholder views a venture as legitimate or 
not legitimate which leads to the concept of a legitimacy 
threshold (Rutherford and Buller 2007). More specifically, 
entrepreneurs need to surpass this legitimacy threshold and 
convince customers and financiers, the two most important 
stakeholders who hold the cash they need, to buy from the 
company and to finance it.
However, as some entrepreneurs intensely focus on 
attracting customers and securing financing, they may 
ignore other stakeholders in the venture’s early legitimacy 
pre-threshold stage (Rutherford and Buller 2007, p. 82). 
Further, in their quest to overcome the liability of newness 
(Singh et al. 1986; Zott and Huy 2007) and achieve the much 
needed legitimacy, some entrepreneurs may intentionally 
misrepresent the facts and tell legitimacy lies (Rutherford 
et al. 2009). This process may result in a “slippery slope” 
(Baron et al. 2015, p. 107) since dishonesty facilitates the 
forgetting of moral rules and the justification of future dis-
honest acts (Shu et al. 2011).
Although stereotypes about entrepreneurial deception and 
the dark side of entrepreneurial leadership paint a potentially 
negative picture for some entrepreneurs (de Vries 1985), 
empirical studies have found entrepreneurs to hold more 
ethical attitudes and higher moral reasoning than managers 
(Bucar and Hisrich 2001; Teal and Carroll 1999). None-
theless, there is one context in which some entrepreneurs 
have been shown to act, at times, deceptively. That is, at the 
very early pre-threshold stage of venture development, some 
entrepreneurs employ “whatever strategies and tactics” are 
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necessary in order to achieve legitimacy (Rutherford et al. 
2009, p. 949). These practices challenge extant stakeholder 
theory which suggests that dealing with stakeholders in a 
respectful and honest manner builds trust and facilitates pro-
ductive relationships (Pollack et al. 2017). Our aim in the 
present work is to examine factors that increase the likeli-
hood of entrepreneurs to morally disengage and justify their 
lies when facing legitimacy pressures. The more entrepre-
neurs are enabled to morally disengage, the less likely they 
are to be regulated by their own moral sanctions, and thus 
more likely to act unethically (Baron et al. 2015). By taking 
a similar perspective, we focus on moral disengagement as 
a process and examine its mediating role in the delivery of 
legitimacy lies while also considering entrepreneurs’ pro-
pensity to morally disengage (Moore 2015).
In building our theoretically based examination of 
legitimacy lies, we focus on entrepreneurs who engage in 
explicit and intentional misrepresentation of fact (i.e., lying), 
because therein resides an interesting question: How are 
entrepreneurs, who should be bound by moral constraints 
and treat all their stakeholders ethically, enabled to engage 
in deception? We provide an answer to this question by pro-
posing a conceptual model that identifies multiple situational 
and individual psychological factors which enable entrepre-
neurs to override their internal moral sanctions and engage 
in deception in their effort to gain venture legitimacy. Here, 
our work offers many theoretical and practical insights.
First, we advance the literature by proposing a model 
that sheds light on the unethical decision-making process 
of entrepreneurs who consciously tell legitimacy lies. We 
focus on moral disengagement as our central mediating 
variable between the need for venture legitimacy and the 
intention to engage in legitimacy lies and also consider 
the most representative, relevant, and impactful factors 
that affect it, in order to produce an integrative, yet parsi-
monious model which is presented in Fig. 1. This model is 
based on a review of entrepreneurial leadership challenges 
(Kuratko 2007) and examines situational factors (moral 
intensity, obsessive passion for the venture, and financial 
distress) as well as individual psychological factors (pro-
pensity to morally disengage, the love of money, immoral 
imagination, the dark personality triad, risk and ethical 
orientations) that have been identified as important in the 
ethics and entrepreneurship literatures. It also considers 
the dynamic nature of the slippery slope since the com-
mitment of an unethical act leads to moral deterioration, 
normalizes unethical behavior, and may influence future 
decisions (Moore and Gino 2015).
Our second contribution is that our approach addresses 
the call for examining entrepreneurial ethics (Brenkert 2009; 
Harris et al. 2009; Rutherford et al. 2009), especially with 
regard to new venture financing (Fassin and Drover 2017). 
As there is very little in the literature with respect to the 
mechanisms that enable entrepreneurial lying (Bryant 2009; 
McVea 2009), drawing on the extant research that focuses on 
unethical decision-making can improve our understanding in 
such environments (Treviño et al. 2014). In such a manner, 
we advance both the ethics and entrepreneurial decision-
making literatures, as neither fully captures the nuances in 
this context or explicitly considers factors that are relevant 
for new ventures and the entrepreneurs who create them.
In the following sections, we expand on these contribu-
tions to the literature. First, we outline the theoretical and 
practical context of nascent ventures and their pressure to 
seek legitimacy. Then, we outline our conceptual model that 
ties situational and individual factors to the mediating role 
Fig. 1  The unethical decision-
making model for legitimacy 
lies
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of moral disengagement in the relationship between the need 
for legitimacy and the intention to tell legitimacy lies, while 
also accounting for the slippery slope of such a process. In 
closing, we present the implications of our model.
Theoretical Context: Legitimacy
New venture legitimacy is broadly accepted as a crucial 
requirement for success and reflects the perception held by 
resource-holding audiences about the venture’s propriety 
(Uberbacher 2014). Put succinctly, the undertaking of legiti-
macy generating activities reduces the threat of venture fail-
ure (Delmar and Shane 2004). The need to seek legitimacy 
originates from the liabilities of newness (LON) as well as 
liabilities of smallness (LOS) that plague nascent and emerg-
ing ventures (Rutherford et al. 2016). Overall, stakeholders 
are hesitant to engage with new and small ventures, which 
leads to a greater probability that nascent ventures will not 
acquire the information and needed resources to survive and 
grow (Bruderl and Schussler 1990; Kale and Arditi 1998). 
Thus, there is pressure on new and small ventures to attain 
legitimacy by any means possible.
Since investors will reject proposed ventures based on the 
characteristics of the entrepreneur and management team 
(Croce et al. 2017), it is important for a newcomer to gain 
legitimacy in order to be deemed as an entrepreneur (De 
Clercq and Voronov 2009). As a result, entrepreneurs need 
to surpass the legitimacy threshold that will enable them to 
receive needed capital and resources (Rutherford and Buller 
2007; Rutherford et al. 2016; Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002).1
The literature has different perspectives as to how new 
venture legitimacy is achieved (Uberbacher 2014). One line 
of thinking is that fortune favors the prepared as demon-
strated by the positive relationship between a well-prepared 
business pitch and venture financing (Pollack et al. 2012). 
However, this relationship is fully mediated by cognitive 
legitimacy which indicates the critical role of legitimacy in 
the survival of a new venture. We diverge from this approach 
as we seek to examine the psychological processes affecting 
the individual entrepreneur who takes an active role in the 
legitimation process. Thus, the most relevant legitimation 
perspectives for our study are (i) the micro-cultural, which 
is based on storytelling, and (ii) the impression management 
perspective.
Although storytelling and impression management have a 
great deal in common, entrepreneurial storytelling relates to 
the development of a new identity rather than the enhance-
ment of an established identity (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001). 
Given the fluid or non-existent identity of young entrepre-
neurial ventures, effectively constructed stories have been 
empirically found to help entrepreneurs acquire the funds 
they seek (Martens et al. 2007). Nonetheless, several stud-
ies have also taken an impression management approach for 
examining new venture financing (Nagy et al. 2012; Parhan-
kangas and Ehrlich 2014).
Over time, entrepreneurs become more skillful at build-
ing legitimacy: while they initially focus on “what matters 
to me” they eventually strike a balance with “what matters 
to me and them” by recognizing the need to address a more 
diverse audience (O’Neil and Ucbasaran 2016). However, 
individuals engage in socially desirable responding (Zerbe 
and Paulhus 1987) when they present themselves favorably 
with respect to current social norms and standards. In this 
manner, they seek to conform to what is expected by external 
audiences who are evaluating them and may use impression 
management in order to deceive (Weiss and Feldman 2006). 
In particular, entrepreneurs feel the pressure to demonstrate 
to external audiences the “propriety” of their new venture 
by conforming to the standards expected by investors (e.g., 
high returns) or customers (e.g., unique selling proposition). 
Overall, the narrative of entrepreneurial stories and impres-
sion management activities can be fraught with deceitful 
practices due to the underlying legitimacy pressures (Pollack 
and Bosse 2014) that might make the difference between the 
survival and death of the venture.
The Unique Context of Early‑Stage Ventures
Since what is judged as ethical or unethical depends, to 
a large extent, on the specific context and individual per-
ceptions (Carlson and Kacmar 1997), early-stage ventures 
provide a unique context for examining unethical behavior 
(Conroy et al. 2017). Here is what the context looks like.
Imagine an entrepreneur who has an idea and maybe 
even a sense of how to develop a unique value proposition 
that can provide substantial customer value. But, in order to 
execute on this value proposition, the entrepreneur needs to 
convince key stakeholders to support the nascent venture. As 
a result, the individual entrepreneur engages in impression 
management (Parhankangas and Ehrlich 2014) and story-
telling (Garud et al. 2014) with the purpose of establishing 
new venture legitimacy. However, the morality embedded in 
the narrative of these entrepreneurial tales can vary greatly 
(Smith and Anderson 2004). Accordingly, as entrepreneurs 
struggle to survive, they may not benefit from the moral 
1 There are multiple different types of legitimacy—cognitive, regula-
tive, normative, industry, etc. But, the current paper aims to delineate 
why entrepreneurs may or may not engage in legitimacy lies. Accord-
ingly, the specific types of legitimacy entrepreneurs are pursuing are 
beyond the scope of our paper. However, for citations to related work 
on the specific topic of legitimacy types see, for example, Bitektine 
(2011), Bitektine and Haack (2015), Rutherford et  al. (2016) and 
Suddaby et al. (2017).
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guidance that might be available in established organizations 
(Ashforth and Anand 2003), even though not all established 
organizations are necessarily ethical and entrepreneurs may 
draw from past experience in established organizations.2 
Under these circumstances, some entrepreneurs may choose 
to act immorally and lie intentionally if such lies will ensure 
the survival of the firm, secure the position of the entrepre-
neur, and increase the public visibility of the firm (Morris 
et al. 2002).
In the specific context of nascent ventures, when entre-
preneurs engage with investors and prospective custom-
ers, informational asymmetries arise which can facilitate 
deception (Fassin and Drover 2017; Kriss et al. 2013). For 
example, entrepreneurs might understand more about a spe-
cific technology and its benefits or may have insights into 
the market that they choose not to share with stakeholders. 
Nonetheless, a financial power asymmetry may also exist 
when potential financiers (e.g., angel investors, VCs), have 
considerably more financial leverage than the new venture 
entrepreneurs they are evaluating. This financial power 
asymmetry further strains the entrepreneur–stakeholder 
relationship, making entrepreneurs potentially experience 
high levels of tension in maintaining control of the narrative 
(Fassin and Drover 2017). At a time when entrepreneurs lack 
legitimacy, information asymmetries and a financial power 
differential create a conducive environment for entrepreneurs 
to deceive. Overall, entrepreneurs may be tempted to lie 
due to their motivation to conform to investor expectations 
and gain the financial resources needed (Pollack and Bosse 
2014). Indeed, Guy Kawasaki—a prominent entrepreneur, 
author, and investor—is fond of noting that, “If an entrepre-
neur’s lips are moving, they are probably lying” (Alboher 
2008).
Legitimacy Lies and Deception
In order to analyze legitimacy lies from an ethical deci-
sion-making lens, we need to clarify the notions of lie and 
deception. As one would expect, there is a lengthy debate 
in philosophy which is considerably more abstract than our 
current focus warrants (Martin 2009). However, the field 
of law provides a practical, clear, and nuanced analysis of 
lies and deception which is coupled with the notion of legal 
culpability. Depending on the circumstances, one may lie 
outright (lie by commission) or may hide vital information 
(lie by omission), both of which are intentional behaviors 
for the purpose of deceiving a stakeholder. This classifi-
cation stems from a fundamental distinction recognized in 
the law of deception, and criminal law in general: culpable 
action and culpable inaction (Ormerod and Laird 2018). 
While culpability resides with intentional acts that cause 
harm, there are circumstances where an omission may also 
be culpable, the general rule being whenever there is a spe-
cial relation between the parties, such as a contractual duty 
or a fiduciary duty (Ormerod and Laird 2018).
In the context of entrepreneurial deception, we take the 
perspective that entrepreneurs could be considered culpable 
for omitting to share relevant information as they may owe a 
particular duty of care to existing and prospective stakehold-
ers. However, such a duty from a legal perspective would 
depend on the nature of the relationship with the stakeholder. 
For instance, there appears to be no such duty towards 
financers who are in early discussion stages and have not 
yet entered in any legal agreement, but there could be a duty 
towards financers who have become company shareholders. 
Nonetheless, omitting information with regard to a customer 
can be considered as a misleading and an unfair commercial 
practice in a wide range of legal systems that seek to protect 
consumers (Katuoka and Navickaitė-Sakalauskienė 2016).
The nature of the relationship between entrepreneurs and 
their stakeholders is also relevant to lies by commission.3 As 
already noted, lying relies on the asymmetry of information 
which naturally varies between stakeholder classes.4 On one 
hand, early investors typically hold less information about 
the company as the company has had less time to interact 
with the market and test its value proposition. On the other 
hand, investors in later stages are more likely to have access 
to more direct and reliable information as there should be 
more tangible evidence in terms of the team’s product and 
market development capabilities. One would thus expect a 
higher instance of entrepreneurial lies in the former case 
versus the latter.
Moreover, impression management or story telling do not 
necessarily entail deception and lies in their usual form; they 
may emphasize the beneficial aspects of the new venture 
and downplay others (Uberbacher 2014). Entrepreneurs may 
even use overly complex or technical language as a camou-
flage to make their communication less transparent (Benson 
et al. 2015). Interestingly, another more sophisticated type of 
lie is paltering, which involves the purposeful use of truth-
ful statements that are misleading within a particular con-
text in order to create a mistaken impression (Rogers et al. 
2017). However, impression management and storytelling 
3 The topic of which stakeholders are needed by entrepreneurs at 
which point in the life cycle of a venture is a complicated area of 
inquiry (for a review, see Pollack et al. (2017). In the present work, 
we focus specifically on the pre-threshold phase of the venture life 
cycle. And, in this particular context the stakeholders whom are most 
important are customers and financiers.
4 We thank one anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this comment.
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in entrepreneurial financing also entail the widespread use 
of hypotheses and assumptions on which presentations and 
valuations are invariably based.5 These assumptions may 
include predictions of future outcomes, such as economic 
growth, technological development, or even geo-political 
conditions, most of which are notoriously difficult to predict. 
Typically, investors expect from entrepreneurs the analysis 
of scenarios (pessimistic, expected, or optimistic), precisely 
because of the speculative nature of these endeavors. As a 
result, we do not in general consider over-optimism a form 
of legitimacy lie. We could, of course, envisage situations 
where intentional misrepresentations of fact could be mas-
queraded as “assumptions” (e.g., the knowing underestima-
tion of the technological advances of a potential competitor). 
However, insofar as genuine assumptions are concerned, 
our considerations stand even if they are manifestly over-
optimistic or misguided. Ultimately, this classification relies 
on the more fundamental distinction between “fact” and 
“opinion” which is also recognized in the law of deception 
(Ormerod and Laird 2018).
Since entrepreneurs may not even perceive their decep-
tions as lies, but “as a simple act of survival” (Feifer 2018, 
p. 24), we conclude our brief review of lying and deception, 
by drawing on the general principles of legal analysis in 
order to refine the concept of lie. While we stress that what 
constitutes a lie is heavily nuanced and contextualized, we 
consider lies to be intentional behaviors for the purpose of 
deceiving a stakeholder.
Rules and Rule‑Breaking
Entrepreneurs are sometimes described as rule-breakers who 
may treat current structure and moral rules as constraints, 
but without their creative, bold, and devious acts, a number 
of companies and products would not have existed (Brenkert 
2009; de Vries 1977). While rule-breaking and breaking the 
law are different issues, both creativity and immorality may 
entail some form of rule-breaking, although the former tends 
to be evaluated positively whereas the latter negatively (Gino 
and Wiltermuth 2014). There is also evidence that creative 
people are more likely to break laws (Cropley et al. 2013; 
Sternberg and Lubart 1995; Sulloway 1996) or to engage in 
deception (Beaussart et al. 2013; Gino and Ariely 2012).
Therefore, there are practical implications for creative 
entrepreneurs who often find themselves constrained by 
moral rules to control any deceptive practices. This is where 
we focus the remainder of our theorizing as we outline a 
theory-based model that can account for the phenomenon of 
legitimacy lies. In sum, it is important that we understand 
the process that leads otherwise ethical, legitimacy seeking, 
entrepreneurs to engage in deceptive behaviors. Similar to 
other studies that have examined unethical behavior (Jones 
and Kavanagh 1996), we identify a set of situational char-
acteristics and a set of individual characteristics that enable 
the entrepreneur to engage in legitimacy lies.
Moral Disengagement
Entrepreneurs with some degree of moral sensitivity will 
invariably recognize that legitimacy lies are immoral, but 
may nevertheless engage in the contemplated action pro-
vided they overcome their internal moral sanctions and 
justify to themselves that such action is appropriate. In 
other words, the external propriety of their venture may be 
established by a legitimacy lie and the internal propriety 
of the lie may be established by a psychological process 
called moral disengagement which allows moral sanctions 
to be lifted (Bandura 1999; Bandura et al. 1996; Baron et al. 
2015). Therefore, while a legitimacy lie seeks to establish 
the propriety of the venture in the eyes of external stake-
holders, moral disengagement is the internal psychological 
mechanism employed by entrepreneurs to establish the pro-
priety of such an immoral act to themselves. Since moral 
disengagement is used by individuals who would rather not 
behave unethically, it is a critical and central component of 
our model—it explains how otherwise honest entrepreneurs 
succumb to new venture legitimacy pressures and justify 
their act of embellishing their stories with legitimacy lies.6
We chose to focus on moral disengagement rather than 
related concepts such as justification, neutralization, or 
rationalization because these terms are often used inter-
changeably. In contrast, moral disengagement appears to be 
defined more precisely, to be theorized more extensively in 
psychological terms (Bandura et al. 1996), and to be well 
studied in a broad array of domains (Moore 2015) and entre-
preneurship in particular (Baron et al. 2015). The concept of 
neutralization was introduced by Sykes and Matza (1957) in 
order to highlight the internal process juvenile delinquents 
engage in order to overcome self-blame from internalized 
norms. This is clearly a very similar concept to moral disen-
gagement, if not the same (Ribeaud and Eisner 2010), albeit 
stemming from a sociological tradition. Ashforth and Anand 
(2003) use these concepts interchangeably as prospective 
rationalizations of corrupt behavior. Similarly, Aguilera 
and Vadera (2008) rely on all the above in order to explain 
how ex ante justifications enable corruption. Interestingly, 
in his integrative model of ethical decision-making Schwartz 
5 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting 
this distinction.
6 For multiple examples of legitimacy lies, see Pollack and Bosse 
(2014) as well as Rutherford et al. (2009).
 V. Theoharakis et al.
1 3
(2016) invokes both Sykes and Matza (1957) and Bandura 
(1999) as a basis of the moral rationalization construct.
Bandura’s (1986) systematic treatment of moral disen-
gagement identifies the following types: (a) euphemistic 
labeling, which is simple exaggerations or points of view; 
(b) minimization of consequences, which seeks to dem-
onstrate that the consequences of the proposed act are not 
serious; (c) displacement of responsibility, which seeks to 
attribute the act to an external cause; (d) diffusion of respon-
sibility, which apportions blame to multiple sources; (e) vic-
tim dehumanization or blame, which attributes the blame to 
the victim or which denies the victim moral status; (f) pal-
liative comparison, which favorably compares the proposed 
act to much larger wrongs; and (g) moral justification, which 
demonstrates that the proposed act may serve an alternative, 
and possibly higher, moral purpose. Table 1 gives typical 
examples of these types of moral disengagement, within the 
entrepreneurial context.
Overall, with the juxtaposition of legitimacy lies and 
moral disengagement, we aim to explain what appears to be 
a paradoxical and interesting situation: when entrepreneurs 
seek to gain external propriety for their venture by engag-
ing in the improper act of legitimacy lies, this generates the 
need for internal propriety which can be achieved by moral 
disengagement. If successful, the process will render the 
immoral legitimacy lie as proper to the entrepreneur, and in 
turn the legitimacy lie may render the venture proper to the 
investor or relevant stakeholder.
Moral Disengagement and Entrepreneurial 
Deception
Ethical decision-making models explain how an individual 
may engage in ethical behavior despite strong motives to 
behave otherwise (Jones 1991; Rest 1986). However, here 
we are concerned with unethical behavior and, in par-
ticular, how an entrepreneur may engage in deception. In 
a meta-analysis conducted on unethical behavior (Kish-
Gephart et al. 2010), only one of the papers used in the main 
analysis relates to entrepreneurship (Neubaum et al. 2004). 
Also, no references are drawn from a new venture context 
in a review of (un)ethical behavior (Treviño et al. 2014). 
In other words, there appears to be a knowledge gap with 
respect to the psychological mechanisms that precipitate the 
entrepreneur’s decision to lie, although Baron et al. (2015) 
find that moral disengagement does lead entrepreneurs to 
unethical decisions.
As noted earlier, Bandura et al. (1996) conceptualizes 
moral disengagement as a process that selectively disen-
gages the moral self-sanctions raised after a negative moral 
evaluation, and precedes the intention to act immorally. 
This moral disengagement process is modeled as a media-
tor between the incentive to act immorally and the intention 
to act (Moore 2015). It follows that, in the present context, 
moral disengagement as a process has a mediating effect on 
the link between the entrepreneurs’ need for legitimacy and 
their intention to employ legitimacy lies. Therefore, given 
that an increased need for legitimacy is broadly accepted to 
increase the pressure for deception (Rutherford et al. 2009), 
we propose the following relationship (see Fig. 1).
Proposition 1 Moral disengagement as a process mediates 
the effect of the need for venture legitimacy on the formation 
of the intention to lie.
Factors Affecting Moral Disengagement
Extant research on moral disengagement reveals a large 
number of constructs that affect moral disengagement 
(Moore 2015). Overall, we know that outlining the moral 
disengagement process, encouraging critical thinking, and 
highlighting harm have the potential to reduce unethical 
behavior (Gino and Margolis 2011). Thus, given what we 
Table 1  Examples of entrepreneurial moral disengagement
Type of moral disengagement Entrepreneurial justification
Palliative comparison Everybody does it
This is nothing compared to what Enron (or XYZ) did
Euphemistic labeling Not really a fact but an opinion
Minimization of consequences Investors expect lies and therefore discount them
Displacement of responsibility Without it we cannot survive in this cut-throat environment
Diffusion of responsibility All members of our team have agreed to it
Dehumanization The rich, greedy, and self-centered investors deserve what they get
Blaming the victim They do not believe us anyway so what is the point of underselling our venture
They should have performed due diligence
Moral justification We have a responsibility towards our employees (or previous funders) and to 
each other to do whatever it takes
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already know, we sought to identify specific constructs rel-
evant for an early-stage entrepreneurial venture context.
We follow other ethical decision-making models and 
identify situational and individual factors that affect moral 
disengagement within a new venture context (Schwartz 
2016). We examine how the entrepreneur’s process to 
morally disengage and ultimately express legitimacy lies 
depends on the situation that may amplify the need for legiti-
macy and the individual characteristics of the entrepreneur. 
This is also consistent with the dual role of moral disengage-
ment which “can be understood both as a relatively stable 
cognitive orientation” which is individual in nature and also 
“as a state triggered by more immediate contextual factors” 
(Moore 2015, p. 202). In our theoretical development, we are 
guided by Kuratko’s (2007) editorial about entrepreneurial 
leadership and his concern about the darker side of entrepre-
neurship which consists of confronting risk, entrepreneurial 
stress, and the entrepreneurial ego. While Kuratko (2007, 
p. 5) acknowledges that not all entrepreneurs fall victims of 
the darker side, he claims that it is important to “recognize 
the idiosyncrasies of entrepreneurial behavior.” He describes 
entrepreneurship as taking place in a chaotic environment 
where creativity and passion are portrayed to have a central 
role in a struggle to gain resources through the presentation 
of a business plan to investors.
Thus, on the situational side, we examine (a) financial 
distress (Proposition 2), (b) moral intensity (Proposition 3), 
and (c) obsessive passion for the venture (Proposition 4). On 
the individual-level side, we examine (a) the propensity of 
an individual to morally disengage (Proposition 5), (b) the 
ethical implications of risk-taking as an essential component 
of entrepreneurial orientation (Proposition 6), (c) the entre-
preneur’s love of money as a very self-centered view about 
gaining financial resources (Proposition 7), (d) immoral cre-
ativity as a negative use of creativity (Proposition 8), (e) the 
entrepreneurial ego as represented by the well-established 
dark personality traits (i.e., psychopathy, Machiavellianism) 
(Proposition 9a, 9b), and (f) ethical orientation (Proposition 
10a, 10b). Finally, we examine the slippery slope of legiti-
macy lies (Proposition 11).
Situational Factors of Moral Disengagement
As recently described by Miska et al. (2018), we conceptual-
ize the situational context as moderating the process leading 
to unethical behavior. More specifically, we propose that at 
the same levels of need for legitimacy, a differing likelihood 
of moral disengagement will be experienced depending on 
situational factors.
Financial Distress
The struggle for resources and support are a root cause for 
entrepreneurial stress which is one of the darker compo-
nents of entrepreneurial leadership (Kuratko 2007). While 
entrepreneurial stress is individual in nature and may also 
be at play, we focus on the contextual cause that is more 
objective in nature which directly relates to a venture’s lack 
of resources and support: financial distress. The relevance 
of financial distress is exemplified by the ubiquitous concern 
about the “venture’s runway,” i.e., the months until the ven-
ture depletes its cash reserves. When a cash-depleted venture 
requires a financing round in order to avoid the severe con-
sequences of bankruptcy, partnering with unethical inves-
tor becomes considerably more likely (Drover et al. 2014). 
This demonstrates that moral standards are more likely to be 
reduced for the venture in distress. Overall, the occurrence 
of financial distress is also linked with fraudulent commu-
nications and reporting by large public firms (Rezaee 2005). 
Financial distress is not treated here as an individual factor 
because it does not refer to an individual trait that character-
izes the entrepreneur, but is rather a situational factor that 
relates to the venture’s financing; such a situation may pro-
vide the entrepreneur with ample justification to morally 
disengage.
Within our context we suggest that, for any given level of 
need for venture legitimacy, the higher the level of financial 
distress, the higher the likelihood for engaging in a moral 
disengagement process. We therefore propose the following:
Proposition 2 Financial distress positively moderates the 
relation between the need for venture legitimacy and moral 
disengagement.
Moral Intensity
The importance of entrepreneurs to hold “moral principles” 
that will help them navigate through the ethical “tenuous 
balance” they often face when trying to “overcome many 
of the organizational obstacles” has been noted (Kuratko 
2007, p. 7). Moral intensity is a contextual factor where the 
characteristics of the issue reflect the “moral imperative in a 
situation” (Jones 1991, p. 372) that entrepreneurs may con-
sider when balancing the situation. As it is linked to more 
sophisticated moral reasoning, Jones (1991) decomposes 
moral intensity into six factors which have different levels 
of impact (McMahon and Harvey 2006; Tsalikis et al. 2008). 
One of these factors is the magnitude of consequences as 
perceived by the moral agent, which Jones defines as “the 
sum of the harms (or benefits) done to the victim (or benefi-
ciaries) of the moral act in question” (Jones 1991, p. 374).
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Overall, these factors relate to our entrepreneurial context 
and depend on those who could be harmed. For example, 
the moral intensity of the situation will depend on if the 
financiers are professional investors, such as VCs and angel 
investors, or inexperienced Friends, Family, and Fools (the 
FFF that often serve as the initial source of funding, and 
anonymous crowd funding investors). In general, when 
the investors are FFF who are more likely to be proximate 
and possibly less experienced, an individual entrepreneur 
is more likely to experience higher levels of moral inten-
sity (Table 2). Besides investors, a similar line of thinking 
applies to the venture’s customers where moral intensity 
would be higher when small, more vulnerable, and famil-
iar customers are involved versus selling to large, well-
resourced, and impersonal businesses.
In their meta-analysis, Kish-Gephart et al. (2010) con-
firmed Jones’s (1991) hypothesis that higher moral intensity 
decreases the likelihood that an individual engages in unethi-
cal behavior. Indeed, the more morally intense a contem-
plated unethical act is (i.e., the larger, the sooner, or more 
probable, proximate, concentrated, socially frowned upon its 
negative consequences are), the more likely it will be for the 
actor to evaluate it as immoral, and accept responsibility for 
its consequences. This is likely to raise self-sanctions fur-
ther, and thus, for any given level of need for legitimacy, the 
more morally intense the situation the less likely it will be 
for an entrepreneur to morally disengage. In sum, while this 
effect is likely to be complicated by the type of investor or 
customer involved (see Table 2), we propose the following:
Proposition 3 The moral intensity of the contemplated lie 
negatively moderates the relationship between the need for 
venture legitimacy and moral disengagement.
Obsessive Passion for the Venture
Kuratko (2007, p. 3) provides a definition of entrepreneur-
ship that highlights it as a dynamic process which requires 
passion. The passion displayed by entrepreneurs is one of 
the most frequently observed phenomena of the entrepre-
neurship process (Smilor 1997). Entrepreneurial passion 
is also a key element that investors seek when making 
new investment decisions (Murnieks et al. 2016). Over-
all, entrepreneurial passion is linked with entrepreneurial 
effectiveness by enhancing goal-oriented cognitions (e.g., 
goal commitment) and entrepreneurial behaviors (e.g., cre-
ative problem solving, persistence) (Cardon et al. 2009). 
However, the purported positive effects of passion may 
mislead investors into indiscriminately seeking passionate 
entrepreneurs, notwithstanding that passion may actually 
not yield benefits or can even have “debilitating” effects 
(Cardon et al. 2005; Ho and Pollack 2014).
It is also important to clarify that passion as described 
by the dualistic model of passion is not a general trait but 
depends on the activity itself (Vallerand et al. 2003). More 
specifically, passion for an activity can be an autonomous 
process that results in harmonious passion or be an uncon-
trolled process that takes the form of obsessive passion. 
While harmonious passion reflects that the person has 
freely chosen the activity which is in harmony with other 
aspects of the person’s life, obsessive passion reflects a 
compulsion to engage in the activity. Although one would 
expect the former to be a more sustainable and desirable 
form of passion, angel investors demonstrate a preference 
for obsessive passion over harmonious passion when they 
evaluate a proposed venture (Murnieks et al. 2016). On the 
other hand, entrepreneurs who are obsessively passionate 
with a particular venture are less likely to be approached 
by peers and receive less business income and less refer-
rals in contrast to entrepreneurs who are harmoniously 
Table 2  Decomposition of moral intensity in an entrepreneurial context
Moral intensity factor Level of moral intensity
Magnitude of the consequence Higher when dealing with FFF vs. professional investors—FFF are less likely to discount the lie and their 
investment is likely to represent a larger part of their assets
Probability of causing harm Higher when dealing with FFF vs. professional investors
Social consensus Lower for professional investors who expect legitimacy lies to be part of the landscape, but higher for FFF 
investors because legitimacy lies breach trust
Social, psychological, and cultural 
proximity
Higher for FFF that are expected to be more proximate, but lower for professional investors and crowd fund-
ing investors who are less proximate; proximity with professional investors, may increase depending on the 
relationship developed
Temporal distance Lower for investors due to the expected lag between financing and investment review milestones
Concentration of the effect Lower for crowdfunding investors and higher for FFF due to the potential number of individuals affected by 
the deception and lower when entrepreneur views the funding entity as a large anonymous organization 
with a diverse investment portfolio and higher if it focuses on the small investment team that might be 
supporting them
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passionate with a venture and received more referrals and 
business income (Ho and Pollack 2014). Further, entre-
preneurs who are obsessively passionate with a venture 
are more likely to engage in unethical pro-organizational 
behavior while those with harmonious passion are more 
likely to abstain from it (Kong 2016).
Following the dualistic model of passion, we consider 
obsessive passion to be contextual: it is not a personal trait 
that characterizes an entrepreneur across all life activities or 
ventures, but is specific to the venture at the time of exami-
nation. For example, an entrepreneur involved in different 
ventures does not necessarily share the same obsessive pas-
sion across ventures. Further, the obsessive passion of an 
entrepreneur may also change even for the specific venture 
across time: in the event of a significant stock dilution or 
increased control by investors, the entrepreneur might lose 
their obsessive passion that characterized them during ear-
lier stages. Overall, we expect that due to their obsessive 
passion with the specific venture, the entrepreneur is more 
likely to prioritize the venture’s viability over moral con-
straints. Therefore, for any given level of venture legitimacy 
need, the more obsessively passionate entrepreneur may be 
more likely to disengage morally in order to overcome their 
self-sanctions. Accordingly, we propose the following:
Proposition 4 Obsessive passion for a venture positively 
moderates the relationship between the need for venture 
legitimacy and moral disengagement.
Individual Factors of Moral Disengagement
We now consider how entrepreneurs’ psychological traits 
may affect the ease of moral disengagement which in turn 
affects the likelihood of legitimacy lies. We focus on the 
effect that propensity to morally disengage, risk orientation, 
love of money, immoral imagination, and the Dark Triad of 
personality traits (i.e., narcissism, psychopathy, and Machi-
avellianism) have on moral disengagement.
Propensity to Morally Disengage
Moral disengagement can also be viewed as a disposition 
describing the propensity of an individual to morally disen-
gage (Moore et al. 2012). It is therefore expected that a “high 
dispositional moral disengagement will amplify unethical 
behavior” (Moore 2015, p. 201). This implies that for any 
given level of venture legitimacy, an entrepreneur with a 
higher propensity to morally disengage will be more likely to 
engage in a moral disengagement process and therefore lie.7
Proposition 5 Entrepreneurs exhibiting higher levels of 
moral disengagement as a disposition are more likely to 
activate a moral disengagement process.
Risk Orientation
Risk is an essential element of entrepreneurial activity, evi-
denced by the inclusion of risk orientation as a component of 
entrepreneurial orientation (Covin and Slevin 1989). How-
ever, entrepreneurial risk may hide a dark side (Kuratko 
2007) since it is associated with greater performance expec-
tations and greater variability in outcomes (Karmann et al. 
2016). Karmann et al. (2016, p. 227) argue that risk-taking’s 
increased outcome variability makes it more likely for agents 
to be tempted in corruption. Their empirical results dem-
onstrate that risk orientation is the only factor of entrepre-
neurial orientation associated with organizational corrup-
tion—they refer to risk orientation as the “darker side” of 
entrepreneurial orientation (p. 231).
Although creating a risk-taking culture may increase crea-
tivity, it may also have implications with regard to ethical 
issues (Baucus et al. 2008). Since risk-taking is also associ-
ated with higher performance expectations, it is more likely 
to result to ethical dilemmas that may favor lifting moral 
sanctions in favor of achieving aggressive targets. We there-
fore propose that:
Proposition 6 Entrepreneurs with higher levels of risk ori-
entation are more likely to activate a moral disengagement 
process.
Love of Money
Entrepreneurial rewards and success are frequently cel-
ebrated (Kuratko 2007, p. 5). The importance an entre-
preneur places on financial success is a key determinant 
explaining growth preferences, the intended size and 
achieved growth of the venture, and the willingness to 
take higher levels of risk (Cassar 2007). However, the 
greed of entrepreneurial leaders, i.e., their desire for, and 
active pursuit of, extraordinary material wealth can have a 
detrimental effect on other stakeholders and is particularly 
deleterious for new startup ventures (Haynes et al. 2015). 
An aspect of such a desire for wealth, has been opera-
tionalized as the love of money which leads to unethi-
cal behavior (Tang and Chiu 2003) and predicts cheating 
(Chen et al. 2014). Further, love of money results in objec-
tification (Wang and Krumhuber 2017), which refers to the 
treatment of others as objects or instruments (Nussbaum 
1995). Objectification is an act of dehumanization that 
involves the denial of a person’s human nature (Haslam 
7 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting 
this issue.
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2006), which is an integral component of moral disengage-
ment as defined by Bandura et al. (1996) (see Table 1). 
As Ariely (2008, p. 24) observes, we very easily rational-
ize our dishonest actions when such a dishonest action 
will have immediate monetary rewards. More specifically, 
since an entrepreneurs’ motivation for financial gains is 
positively related to moral disengagement (Baron et al., 
2015), we propose that the following:
Proposition 7 Entrepreneurs with higher levels of love of 
money are more likely to activate a moral disengagement 
process.
Immoral Imagination
The entrepreneurial spirit is characterized by imagination, 
creativity, novelty, and sensitivity; it takes imagination and 
creativity to develop new solutions for existing or new prob-
lems (Buchholz and Rosenthal 2005; Kuratko 2007). In this 
context, moral imagination has been described as a qual-
ity which allows a person to become sensitive to a wide 
range of factors around business decision-making that may 
generate harm. According to McVea (2009, p. 491), moral 
imagination enables decision-makers to combine their crea-
tivity with ethical rigor in order to overcome the constraints 
of rule-based ethical frameworks. He adopts Moberg and 
Seabright’s (2000) conceptualization and finds, inter alia, 
that entrepreneurs exhibit a high degree of moral imagina-
tion and could thus generate alternative courses of action 
that loosen the constraints of the problematic situation.
However, Seabright and Schminke (2002) note that the 
definition of moral imagination is valence-neutral and could 
apply equally well to imagination that fosters immoral activ-
ity. Their conceptualization of immoral imagination focuses 
on forms of evil that are ends in themselves (revenge and 
sadism). However, according to Baumeister (1996), evil, and 
by association immorality and immoral imagination, also 
entails harm as means to an end (greed, ambition, and ideal-
ism). Such a holistic view of immoral imagination makes it 
particularly relevant to our model, because entrepreneurial 
deception is a means towards legitimacy, rather than an end 
to itself. Following Seabright and Schminke’s (2002) con-
ceptualization, immoral imagination could generate alterna-
tive courses of action that loosen the constraints imposed by 
self-sanctions, in other words, enable moral disengagement. 
In particular, immoral imagination prompts immoral action 
by dehumanizing others and, as noted earlier, such dehuman-
ization is a typical form of moral disengagement. Entrepre-
neurs who exhibit high degrees of immoral imagination are 
more likely to generate imaginative ways to disengage from 
the moral charge of the proposed deception. More formally, 
we propose the following:
Proposition 8 Entrepreneurs with higher levels of immoral 
imagination are more likely to activate a moral disengage-
ment process.
Dark Triad of Personality Traits
Entrepreneurs are known to be different in regard to the Big 
Five personality traits when compared with managers; these 
traits are also relevant in predicting entrepreneurial inten-
tion, activity, and performance (Brandstätter 2011; Leutner 
et al. 2014). However, attention has been raised on the entre-
preneurial ego as a darker side of entrepreneurial leadership 
(Kuratko 2007), and a call for studying the negative side of 
the entrepreneurial personality has also been made (Miller 
2015). The Dark Triad of personality traits is comprised of 
three malevolent and ego-centric characteristics: psychopa-
thy, Machiavellianism, and narcissism (Paulhus and Wil-
liams 2002). While these personality traits are commonly 
found among business leaders and politicians, some have 
been linked with unproductive (i.e., value appropriating, 
rent seeking) entrepreneurial motives of early-stage nascent 
entrepreneurs among a sample of business students (Hmie-
leski and Lerner 2016).
Psychopathic individuals are characterized by lack of 
affective empathy, but their cognitive empathy enables them 
to understand what motivates others and makes them very 
capable in manipulating them (Hmieleski and Lerner 2016). 
In its primary psychopathy form, individuals are also char-
acterized as being shallow and unable to accept responsibil-
ity, while in its secondary form individuals are impulsive, 
seek stimulation, and have antisocial tendencies such as 
criminal versatility, delinquency, and likelihood to reoffend 
(Levenson et al. 1995). Babiak et al. (2010) find corporate 
psychopathy to be positively associated with key elements 
of impression management such as charisma and presenta-
tion style reflecting creativity, good strategic thinking, and 
communication skills, but negatively associated with being 
a team player, management skills, and overall accomplish-
ments. With entrepreneurs being stereotyped as corporate 
psychopaths (Akhtar et al. 2013), Stevens et al. (2012) find 
that psychopathy in a business context positively relates to 
moral disengagement. This is consistent with other studies 
that find psychopathy to predict lying (Roeser et al. 2016), 
positively correlate with moral disengagement (Egan et al. 
2015) or with unproductive entrepreneurial motives (Hmie-
leski and Lerner 2016).
Individuals who exhibit high levels of Machiavellianism 
use deceit and manipulation in order to achieve their own 
goals with disregard to the needs of others (Christie and 
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Geis 1970). While they are cynical and have a strong need 
for money and power, they are socially skillful and may 
even exhibit helping behaviors as part of their manipula-
tion for self-gain (Hmieleski and Lerner 2016; Kessler 
et al. 2010). As a result of their broader view that the 
ends justify the means, Machiavellian individuals quickly 
engage in deviant behaviors and unethicality is an integral 
part of the trait (Côté et al. 2011; Dahling et al. 2009). Fur-
ther, Machiavellians use impression management rather 
indiscriminately and use more risky and more deceptive 
forms of it; they do not use impression management to 
please others, but to achieve their own ends (Bolino and 
Turnley 2003). Moreover, their selfishness appears to 
enhance their engagement in pro-organizational unethical 
behaviors as they tend to abandon ethical standards and 
value manipulative behavior (Castille et al. 2018).
Narcissistic individuals are self-centered, seek atten-
tion, admiration, and applause, and maintain an exagger-
ated self-concept about their importance and influence 
(Twenge et  al. 2008). Although narcissism appears to 
be a trait that is consistently increasing over time, when 
Twenge et al. (2008) reviewed the relevant literature, they 
found narcissism to be linked with a range of positive emo-
tions such as self-esteem, positive affect, extraversion, and 
life satisfaction. Further, they also describe narcissism to 
be associated with short-term (but not long-term) likeabil-
ity, enhanced performance in public tasks, and short-term 
victories in competitive tasks. It is therefore not a surprise 
that narcissistic individuals are judged to be more success-
ful in pitching creative ideas, not necessarily because they 
are more creative, but because they were more enthusiastic 
and appear more charismatic (Goncalo et al. 2010). Zuo 
et al. (2016) describe narcissism as the brightest of the 
Dark Triad and find it to be positively related to inter-
nalization and symbolization, the two dimensions of moral 
identity that motivate moral action (Aquino and Reed 
2002). It is therefore plausible that while narcissistic entre-
preneurs enthusiastically pitch their new ideas and seek 
to be applauded, this is done while maintaining a moral 
compass. Although concerns have been raised about the 
narcissistic predisposition of leaders in general (de Vries 
and Miller 1985), narcissistic CEOs demonstrate a propen-
sity for higher levels of entrepreneurial orientation (Wales 
et al. 2013), i.e., seek higher levels of proactiveness, inno-
vation, and risk-taking (Covin and Slevin 1989). More rel-
evant to our context, narcissistic individuals demonstrate 
higher levels of entrepreneurial intention and are linked 
with productive entrepreneurial motives (Hmieleski and 
Lerner 2016). Overall, narcissism does not predict moral 
disengagement nor unethical attitudes and behavior (Egan 
et al. 2015; Roeser et al. 2016). In summary, narcissism is 
described as the least malevolent among the dark personal-
ity traits, while narcissists as the least vulnerable to moral 
disengagement (Roeser et al. 2016, p. 76). Accordingly, 
we do not include it in our model.
Hence, in our examination of the individual Dark Triad 
traits, we focus on psychopathy and Machiavellianism as 
related to unproductive/value appropriating entrepreneur-
ial behavior among nascent entrepreneurs (Hmieleski and 
Lerner 2016) and moral disengagement (Egan et al. 2015). 
We therefore propose the following:
Proposition 9a,b Entrepreneurs with higher levels of (a) 
psychopathy, and (b) Machiavellianism are more likely to 
activate a moral disengagement process.
Proposition 9c Entrepreneurs with higher levels of (c) nar-
cissism are not more likely to activate a moral disengage-
ment process.
Ethical Orientation
We conclude our theorizing with a fundamental distinction 
in the ethical orientation (O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005) 
of entrepreneurs. Ethical orientations are predispositions of 
individuals engaging in moral evaluations to favor a par-
ticular ethical framework over another. Two of the most 
prominent ethical orientation frameworks, which are often 
contrasted with one another as polar opposites, are the 
deontological and the consequentialist frameworks. On one 
hand, a deontological orientation assesses an act normatively 
based on a predetermined set of accepted rules that define 
what is proper (Rawwas et al. 2005). On the other hand, a 
consequentialist orientation assesses the act based on the 
good (or harm) it causes and to whom (Chakrabarty and 
Bass 2015).
Rutherford et al. (2009) propose that deontological and 
consequentialist (such as utilitarian) orientations are likely 
to affect the ethical evaluation of legitimacy lies. Specifi-
cally, they note that while a deontological orientation is 
likely to assess lying as intrinsically and absolutely wrong, 
a consequentialist orientation is more likely to be nuanced 
and is more likely to lead to rationalization of the proposed 
lie. In fact, Xu and Ma (2016) find individuals who view 
themselves as moral are more likely to prefer a deontologi-
cal versus a consequentialist orientation. We therefore argue 
that entrepreneurs with a deontological orientation are more 
likely to assess the contemplated legitimacy lies as abso-
lutely wrong, raise their self-sanctions, and therefore find 
it harder to morally disengage. We therefore propose the 
following:
Proposition 10a Entrepreneurs with higher levels of deon-
tological orientation are less likely to activate a moral dis-
engagement process.
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However, entrepreneurs with a consequentialist orien-
tation are more likely to see the contemplated lie under a 
more nuanced light that considers the utilitarian outcome of 
actions (Chakrabarty and Bass 2015). Under such a perspec-
tive, self-sanctions would be loosened as benefit of the out-
come may offset its costs which would provide the needed 
justification and clearly facilitate moral disengagement. We 
therefore propose the following:
Proposition 10b Entrepreneurs with higher levels of con-
sequentialist orientation are more likely to activate a moral 
disengagement process.
The Slippery Slope of Legitimacy Lies
Despite their obvious importance, the dynamics of deception 
have received limited attention in the literature.8 One aspect 
of the dynamic nature of deception concerns its escalation 
over time and the other concerns the continuity or abruptness 
of such an escalation. These two aspects often get conflated, 
as in Levi’s (2008) conceptualization of the slippery slope as 
the spiraling of deceptions. This perspective is widely shared 
since the escalation of corruption in organizations has been 
identified as being dynamic: the rationalization of an initial 
unethical act enables the enactment of a more serious cor-
rupt act (Zyglidopoulos et al. 2009).
Fleming and Zyglidopoulos (2008) identify two escala-
tion mechanisms among managers that are also relevant to 
our present focus: (a) the cover up of past lies, and (b) the 
routinization of deception rationalization. This is consistent 
with the view that individuals can become accustomed in 
employing moral disengagement resulting in habitual use 
that ultimately influences what they consider as being mor-
ally acceptable (Moore et al. 2019). Further, Garrett et al. 
(2016) offer a neurobiological basis for the slippery slope of 
deception as the human brain adapts to dishonesty; a gradual 
increase in self-serving deception is accompanied by a signal 
reduction in the amygdala.
Overall, in the slippery slope metaphor the ethical stand-
ards of the subject’s behavior slip gradually after a series of 
small transgressions which escalate over time (Welsh et al. 
2015) so it is not a single event that makes one come to the 
realization that they are acting unethically (Arjoon 2008). 
Finally, the fact that while sliding down the slippery slope 
the subject becomes unaware of the moral infractions (Cam-
pana 2016) indicates that the slippery slope dynamic induces 
forgetting of moral rules. In particular, prior cheating leads 
to the forgetting of moral rules and ethical boundaries (Shu 
and Gino 2012) and makes subsequent moral disengagement 
more likely (Shu et al. 2011). This has led researchers to 
explicitly refer to the existence of a positive “feedback loop” 
when describing the psychological mechanism of the slip-
pery slope in general (Corner et al. 2011) or in the context of 
moral disengagement (Moore and Gino 2015; Shu and Gino 
2012; Shu et al. 2011) and escalation of deception (Flem-
ing and Zyglidopoulos 2008). Thus, a positive relationship 
between legitimacy lies and subsequent moral disengage-
ment is expected, leading us to propose that:
Proposition 11 Prior legitimacy lies will have a gradual 
positive effect on the moral disengagement of subsequent 
legitimacy lies.
The above proposition is reflected in our conceptual 
model with a path from (previous) legitimacy lies to the 
(current) contemplation to morally disengage for a new 
legitimacy lie (see Fig. 1).
Discussion
Overview
On the surface, the premise that entrepreneurs should not 
tell lies seems defensible. However, this is not always the 
case. It is clear from the literature that entrepreneurs, at 
times, do lie to stakeholders in order to take a step closer to 
being viewed as legitimate—and these legitimacy lies are 
not at all well understood. As Fassin (2005) notes, as entre-
preneurs desire to win, some individuals will avoid failure 
in every possible way available. He further maintains that, in 
the face of a crisis, otherwise honest entrepreneurs may be 
tempted to behave unethically as it might be the “least worse 
option” (p. 271). Therefore, our aim was to develop a model 
that could help enhance our understanding of unethical deci-
sion-making in the context of entrepreneurial new ventures 
by exploring individual and situational factors that affect 
moral disengagement and enable the delivery of legitimacy 
lies. We also address the call for paying attention to how 
people actually behave unethically, rather than how people 
should think about their behavior, which is the subject area 
of normative ethics (Bazerman and Gino 2012). Overall, we 
anticipate that our theorizing will provide an ample founda-
tion from which multiple lines of inquiry can proceed.
Theoretical Implications
Here, we outline our primary contributions to the literature. 
First, we develop a novel theoretical model which helps 
us understand how an otherwise honest entrepreneur may 
8 We would like to acknowledge the contribution of an anonymous 
reviewer who encouraged us to develop our theoretical model in this 
direction.
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engage in legitimacy lies. This model recognizes both the 
mediating role of moral disengagement as a process and also 
the effect of the entrepreneur’s propensity to morally disen-
gage. We also identify multiple situational and individual 
factors relevant to a new venture context based on a review 
of entrepreneurial leadership issues (Kuratko 2007). While 
our list is certainly not exhaustive, we aim to explain how 
these factors may lead to an increased likelihood of moral 
disengagement. We, thus, hope that our work will stimulate 
more research that can empirically test the propositions pre-
sented as well as develop others. Our work also has the pro-
pensity to stimulate the empirical testing of more dynamic 
models, in order to explain the slippery slope of entrepre-
neurial deception in ways complementary to those of the 
study of the escalation of deception in organizations (Flem-
ing and Zyglidopoulos 2008). This is particularly important, 
since we know that smaller lies may lead to larger ones (Gar-
rett et al. 2016).
Second, we contribute to the entrepreneurial ethics litera-
ture which has primarily focused on ethical decision-making 
processes rather than unethical decision-making (Treviño 
et al. 2014). In particular, we address how the context of 
nascent ventures presents unique challenges due to the lack 
of legitimacy of these organizations. This is critical since 
ethical or unethical behavior depends, to a large extent, on 
the specific context and individual perceptions (Carlson 
and Kacmar 1997). Here, our work more fully integrates 
the extant literature to accommodate a nuanced approach 
that provides greater clarity in terms of unethical decision-
making—and, as startups and new ventures are the growth 
engine of individual economies, deepening our understand-
ing of their unethical behavior is imperative.
Practical Implications
On a more practical note, we provide a framework for stake-
holders who may now better understand how honest entre-
preneurs are capable of engaging in deceptive practices. 
Pollack and Bosse (2014) explored how and why investors 
may forgive entrepreneurs for lying, but they missed a large 
piece of the puzzle in that the reasons for telling the lie in the 
first place can be predicted. By providing valuable insights 
on mechanisms of entrepreneurial deception, entrepreneurs 
may gain the ability to self-reflect and refrain from rational-
izing an act they recognize as deceptive and, thus, reduce 
legitimacy lies. Further, stakeholders may take diagnostic, 
preemptive, and preventative measures in order to minimize 
moral disengagement and its resulting deception. Here, even 
if they fail in their interventions, by diagnosing the situa-
tion more accurately, investors and other stakeholders may 
at least be more prepared to receive and deal with entrepre-
neurial deception.
A way to decrease moral disengagement is to increase 
moral intensity. Specifically, a more personal approach from 
stakeholders would increase proximity to the entrepreneur 
and, therefore, increase moral intensity, reducing the pos-
sibility of dehumanization in any moral disengagement pro-
cess. For example, VCs may explain that by being forced to 
discount (i.e., due to moral hazard and information asym-
metry) what entrepreneurs communicate they might even 
discount truths, which is harmful for the venture and the 
entrepreneurs. They also need to point out that the mag-
nitude of the effect and probability of the harm caused by 
entrepreneurial deception is large for them in financial and 
reputational terms. Similarly, FFFs (Friends, Fools, and 
Family), board members, business partners, and customers 
need to emphasize the non-trivial financial and relational 
impact on them if the information provided is not accurate.
As entrepreneurs are more likely to engage in deception 
if they feel that its impact is far out in the future, stakehold-
ers could also emphasize, preemptively, the immediacy of 
the effect that lies may have on them. For example, custom-
ers can explain the immediate impact the product has if it 
does not meet the promised specifications or delivery dates. 
Further, investors need to demonstrate that they take a seri-
ous view about entrepreneurial lies by proactively raising 
moral awareness in early meetings and engaging in preemp-
tive interventions such as priming (e.g., signing a code of 
ethics early on) which can reduce unethical behavior (Shu 
et al. 2011, 2012).
Stakeholders may also seek to diagnose individual entre-
preneurial characteristics such as risk-taking, immoral imag-
ination, or pronounced love of money in order to predict the 
likelihood that they may become victims of legitimacy lies. 
Similarly, they need to be particularly vigilant with entrepre-
neurs with signs of Machiavellianism or psychopathy which 
are characteristics often found among leaders and success-
ful entrepreneurs. If investors choose to fund such entrepre-
neurs, they should expect and prepare for the eventuality of 
being victims of legitimacy lies. The challenge remains in 
identifying these traits or any other correlates that might be 
more easily detectable. For example, sensation seeking has 
long been known to be a strong predictor of risky behavior 
(Horvath and Zuckerman 1993) and to relate to psychopa-
thy (Levenson et al. 1995). Interestingly, sensation seeking 
CEOs (e.g., private plane pilots) are more risk-taking and 
innovative (Sunder et al. 2017), but are at the same time have 
lower financial reporting quality and a higher likelihood of 
accounting fraud (Lobo et al. 2018).
Overall, investors select teams based on their ability to 
do what it takes in order to be able to deliver and properly 
execute on the business plan presented. However, given the 
resource constrained conditions of the venture and the con-
siderable informational asymmetry present, the ethically 
savvy investor should be apprehensive about investing in 
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teams that do whatever it takes. As such, our model contrib-
utes to new venture practice by providing a wide range of 
factors that can affect moral disengagement, with the pur-
pose of reducing deception.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
We present a conceptual model which includes a number of 
factors that have been identified as challenges for entrepre-
neurial leadership (Kuratko 2007). However, this list is not 
exhaustive and future research can examine a wider range 
of potentially relevant factors—and, related, even the dif-
ferences between situational and individual factors may not 
always be clear (e.g., passion, risk) and may also interact. 
Moreover, as we have already alluded to, the effects pre-
sented in our model may be nuanced with respect to the type 
of stakeholder and the relationship between the entrepreneur 
and stakeholder—and the types of lies may have some vary-
ing gradation of intensity. Further, the model lends itself to 
empirical testing that could provide additional validation 
for the proposed relationships. It would also be intriguing 
to longitudinally study a large cohort of nascent ventures 
and examine the phenomenon of legitimacy lies over time. 
Such an exploration could examine the gradual nature of 
the slippery slope (Garrett et al. 2016; Shu et al. 2011) and 
the routinization of legitimacy lies (Fleming and Zyglido-
poulos 2008) against the possibility of more abrupt changes 
in moral behavior (Köbis et al. 2017). This implies that the 
nature of the “feedback loop” leading to the slippery slope 
might be more nuanced than shown in our model and may 
itself depend on other factors.
Our model’s implications on legitimacy lies need to be 
further refined in order to better account for the different 
stakeholders and their ability to protect themselves. For 
example, investors with less experience might be more vul-
nerable relative to professional investors who have extensive 
experience in managing investment portfolios. Similarly, 
customers who are less capable of performing the neces-
sary due diligence may more easily fall victims of legitimacy 
lies. Employees as minority shareholders may feel helpless 
and even trapped; this may depend on the time and effort 
they have invested in the new venture where they may also 
be called to engage in legitimacy lies in front of customers 
and investors. Possibly, new venture employees or partners 
may have their own legitimacy lies threshold limit for the 
amount of unethical practices they are willing to withstand; 
above a certain level they may become more likely to exit 
the firm depending on their own morality.
Further, it is possible that some or all of the eight types 
of moral disengagement presented in Table 1 may affect the 
relationships theorized in the propositions above in different 
degrees. For instance, we can see how the lack of empathy 
that characterizes psychopathy or Machiavellianism may be 
more influential on moral disengagement that takes the form 
of blaming the victim or dehumanization rather than pal-
liative comparison or minimization of consequences. We 
believe that such thinking—in addition to examining how 
the bright side such as need for achievement, commitment, 
perseverance—could provide a setting for considerable ana-
lytical depth and may be a fruitful line of future inquiry. 
Finally, the pitching process for raising capital resembles 
lies in a sales context—and, accordingly, the integration of 
sales ethics literature could further inform the literature on 
entrepreneurial ethics.9
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